

JPRS 76827

17 November 1980

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1081

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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INTERNATIONAL

SHEVARDNADZE ON TIES WITH U.S., PRC, AFGHANISTAN, BRAZIL

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 10 Sep 80 p 2

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Politburo Candidate Member E. A. Shevardnadze: "On the Road to Peace and Cooperation"]

[Text] On 6 July Brazil's largest newspaper, FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, published the following interview with CPSU Central Committee Politburo Candidate Member E. A. Shevardnadze:

[Question] The policy of detente being implemented by the USSR has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the military potential of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Does this mean that the USSR ties detente in with development of the socialist bloc's military power?

[Answer] Detente is not a political slogan, but a strategy for development of relations among nations. The general line of development of our system consists of building a society of the greatest justice and welfare. To do so, we must contribute assets to the development of economics, education, and culture, so as to raise our people's standard of living. To achieve this goal, we need peace. V. I. Lenin, the founder of our state, formulated the principles of Soviet foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence and mutual respect between countries and nations. This is precisely why the USSR has authored 30 peace initiatives, which were proposed at the most varied international forums. Quite recently the Warsaw Pact countries proposed holding a summit conference of the leaders of states in all regions of the world with the goal of deepening detente, which is invariably leading to arms limitation. But inasmuch as we are striving for a peace which would allow us to build the new society, we must also strengthen our defenses.

In recent times the USA's military outlays have risen and, as President Carter declared, they will continue to grow. And the responsibility for all this is placed upon the USA's military-industrial complex, which exists in accordance with its own laws, ones demanding huge and constant outlays. I feel that even if President Carter attempts to stop this machine, he will not be able to do so. We do not have the same sort of problem. Were we to summon the minister of aviation industry tomorrow and order him to halt production of warplanes, industry would switch immediately and unquestioningly to the manufacture of civil airplanes or other aircraft. But were the U.S. administration to attempt to do something of this sort, it would hardly remain in power for any length of time. This is precisely why we observe a constant tendency for increase in military expenditures in the USA. On the other hand we believe that the USA is ahead of us in the number of

nuclear warheads on missiles positioned in numerous countries of Europe, including those in immediate proximity to the borders of the USSR, Turkey in particular.

Knowing that these missiles are aimed at us, we are forced to invest additional resources into defense. We believe our defensive potential to be a necessary factor counteracting imperialist military policy.

Were the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist fraternity not to possess such a level of defenses, it would be likely that imperialism would dominate the entire world.

[Question] The SALT-TWO treaty is frozen, and NATO is preparing to place new missiles on European territory. Does this mean that detente has been abandoned?

[Answer] As I just said, the missiles are aimed at the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist fraternity. In other words Western missiles are aimed against detente. What is the goal of this policy of placing new missiles in Europe? The answer is not so difficult. This policy pursues the goal of regaining military superiority in relation to countries of the Warsaw Pact, which are now in a situation of parity. We know that any action by the other side would serve only as a new impulse for the arms race. But we do not want Europe to become an arena of a new world war; hence Comrade Brezhnev's decision to reduce troops and arms in Europe on a unilateral basis. Unfortunately the other side did not respond in kind. But even in this case we do not preclude the possibility of coming to an agreement. And therefore we lay great hopes on the meeting of heads of state in Madrid. I think that practical solutions in political and military areas pertaining not only to the European countries but the entire world as well will be found in this meeting. Consequently ways will be found in this meeting to improve the climate of detente through honest and unbiased political discussion, without coercion and threats. To sum up, I would emphasize that it will not be easy to abandon detente, inasmuch as it is the end goal of all of the world's nations.

[Questions] What assessment does Moscow give to its relations with the USA during the Carter presidency?

[Answer] Frankly speaking, this presidency was not the best in the history of Soviet-American relations. The reverse is more likely true. Fabricated problems--first "protection of human rights" and later "the Afghan question"--complicated our relations rather sufficiently. It is a pity that many of the agreements that were the result of a long road of negotiations were recently scrapped. It was precisely during Carter's presidency that the absurd trade boycott was imposed and the challenge to boycott the Moscow Olympics was made. I do not know what goal Mr Carter's advisers were pursuing when they decided to cancel their contract to sell grain to the Soviet Union. Could it be that they hoped to starve us out?

That is an entirely absurd thought. We also had to survive a trade blockade by the West in the first years of socialist construction, but we withstood it, and we became what we are today--a great power. A serious politician would not even entertain the thought that in the modern world, one power could force another to its knees by a trade boycott.

However, we must admit that there were positive moments in relations with the USA as well, for example the signing of SALT-TWO. Unfortunately this treaty has still not been ratified, which is incidentally yet another indication of the inconsistency of the policy followed by the present American administration.

[Question] China sees the Soviet Union as its main enemy. How are relations with the PRC assessed today? Is there a possibility for closer relations with the PRC?

[Answer] We believe our relations with China to be absolutely unsatisfactory. As in the times of Mao Zedong, the foreign policy line of China is characterized by hostility toward the USSR and its friends. And today, an attempt is being made on this basis to form some sort of "broadest international front"--or, to put it more simply--a bloc of all forces united by hostility toward the USSR.

Beijing's leaders see aggravation of the situation and growth of international tension as factors favorable to creation of this front. And this means that such a bloc is by essence aimed against relaxation of international tension.

It seems to me that the present Beijing leaders do not want to develop normal relations with the USSR, and that all of their declarations in this regard are nothing more than demagoguery and monstrous anti-Soviet propaganda through and through. They falsify the history of Sino-Soviet relations, and they accuse the Soviet Union of territorial claims which it had never harbored. Beijing's leaders are acting in total conspiracy with the most reactionary forces on the right. But we are certain that sooner or later, the Chinese people will speak their decisive say concerning Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union.

[Question] Respect for human rights is one of the basic provisions of socialism. But at the same time the attitude displayed in the USSR toward dissidents elicits amazement. Why does Soviet society punish them so severely?

[Answer] Protection of human rights is one of the fundamental principles of socialism, a principle said to be one of the achievements of true socialism. Every citizen of the USSR enjoys the broadest rights--political, economic, and social. He has the right, for example, to publicly criticize any individual and any leader at a trade union meeting or in the press. Even I, despite my rather high position, have been subjected to criticism in the republic more than once. Of course it is not all that pleasant for me to hear critical remarks addressed toward me, but criticism is inherent to our system.

There are no restrictions upon Soviet citizens in relation to criticism of shortcomings that do exist in fact. I might even go as far as saying that it is in the blood of the Soviet citizen to criticize everything that seems wrong to him. The human rights problem can be stated as how best to exercise the rights documented in the constitution, in the Communist Party Program, and in the laws. So that you might understand the problem better, I would like to stress that deepening of democratic foundations is a basic characteristic of the present stage of our political system's development.

Soviet society continues to seek ways to make society more democratic. Here, however, another aspect of the issue appears: In socialism, democratic conditions

require high organization and discipline which, in my opinion, are inalienable guarantees of full exercise of human civil rights.

And paramount here is the high activity of every member of the society, promoting and defending his rights. The motive force of capitalist society is competition, which is absent from our society.

Without considering this difference, it would be difficult to understand the problem of human rights in our society. Some assert that we punish dissidents very strictly. This is not so. People are not persecuted for their convictions and ideas in the USSR, since this would go against the grain of the principles of our structure. We condemn and punish for concrete socially dangerous actions. Consequently Soviet society punishes not for convictions and ideas, but for crimes committed against society. Soviet law insures, for example, protection of Soviet citizens and the political system as a whole against slander. This is foreseen by our laws, and it in no way contradicts international law and the Declaration of Human Rights. Crimes of this sort are punished with no lesser severity in England, the FRG, and the USA, where the penalty for subversive activity against the state is up to 10 years imprisonment.

[Question] The USSR brought its troops into Afghanistan. By what were these actions justified? What are the real prospects for withdrawing these troops?

[Answer] Recently the Afghan people celebrated the second anniversary of the April Revolution. This is naturally a very short time, but it was very important to the history of this country, since power transferred to the hands of the people. This event was a strong and unexpected blow to imperialism, which held its position in this country for many years. Moreover this revolution shook imperialism's position in the Middle East as a whole as well. Every revolution is known to have its enemies. The facts show that bands of counterrevolutionaries are being dropped into Afghanistan from the territory of other countries, armed by American and Pakistani special services and with the support of the Beijing leaders. I have never been there, but I know that they are forming regular troops armed to the teeth with a single goal--crushing the revolution of the Afghan people. The Afghan people found it difficult to repel imperialist aggression, and their government appealed for aid to the Soviet Union more than 10 times. And it was only in December of last year that our leaders decided to send troops there. This was a very complex and delicate issue, but we had no alternatives: Either we had to help the Afghan people defend their April achievements, or we had to permit the revolution to be strangled. The issue of rendering this aid was discussed in detail. From the standpoint of international law it is completely irreproachable, since it is foreseen by an appropriate article in a treaty between the two countries. Consequently this was a legal move. Now that our troops are protecting the territory of Afghanistan from foreign interference, the situation is gradually returning to normal. It is not yet completely stable, inasmuch as only the first steps have been taken in the direction of normalization. But I think that Afghanistan's recent proposal to reestablish mutual understanding with neighboring countries should be analyzed intensively by all. Presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is not interference in the internal affairs of this country, as imperialist propaganda asserts; instead, it is a response to a request by the Afghan government for military aid. And we will withdraw our troops from there when the threat of imperialist aggression disappears, since it is also a threat to our borders.

[Question] As we know, Brazil did not support the campaign to boycott the Moscow Olympics. What has this political step done to the future of bilateral relations?

[Answer] This boycott was one of the most shameful acts of the Carter administration. This act attests to its desire to intentionally mix sports with politics. But we know that it did this on the basis of its preselected goals. The boycott is a shameful blemish in the history of the USA, an incident which will be judged appropriately by history. Most countries did not support the boycott, thus demonstrating their farsightedness. Brazil, its government, its Olympic Committee, and the people themselves also revealed their wisdom and independence. Such behavior only reinforced our confidence that Brazil is following the road of independent and sovereign development.

As far as bilateral relations are concerned, I would like to recall that important steps have been made toward strengthening them in the last 15 years, and a great deal of experience has been accumulated. There were negative aspects as well, but even they should be interpreted positively, inasmuch as the analysis of history should help build the future, and not condemn the past. I feel that we have all the conditions for significantly expanding bilateral relations on the basis of the principle of strengthening respect between states. Great is the distance separating us. But modern technology reduces all distances. Possessing tremendous human and material resources, by cooperating with one another, we could in many ways promote development of our countries and mankind as a whole. I should note that our positions agree in terms of the major problems of modern times: racism and harmonic development of the world. Moreover our cooperation in the UN has recently become more intensive. We enjoy good prospects for widening cooperation in different economic sectors: production of steel and lumber, oil extraction, and in the scientific and cultural areas. The Soviet people like Brazilian music, literature and, of course, Brazilian football very much. I returned from this country impressed by its possibilities and by the effort being undertaken here to solve the urgent problems. I returned firmly convinced that the people and government of Brazil want to strengthen cooperation with the Soviet Union without infringing upon the interests of third countries. We hope that effective steps will be taken during President Figueiredo's visit to our country. We await this visit with great interest, and we are certain that it will have great significance to bilateral relations.

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CSO: 1807

INTERNATIONAL

SYRIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP DAYS HELD IN GEORGIAN SSR

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 28 Sep 80 p 3

[Article: "Our Friendship Serves Peace"]

[Excerpts] Syrian-Soviet friendship days in the Georgian SSR, which included among their participants a delegation representing the Society of Arab Syrian-Soviet Friendship headed by Arab Socialist Revival Party Central Committee Member, Society of Arab Syrian-Soviet Friendship Presidium Member Ali Baddur, have drawn to a close. The days from 19-27 September were extremely busy for the delegation.

Speaking at meetings of Syrian-Soviet friendship, the republic's laborers spoke of their friendship and solidarity with the courageous Syrian people and expressed their avid support for their just struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and for liberation of Israel-occupied Arab territories and establishment of a just, sound peace in the Near East.

Ali Baddur granted an interview to a correspondent of "GruzINFORM" prior to his departure by air.

"We are fortunate," he said, "to express to the laborers of Georgia and to all Soviet people the feeling of friendship and gratefulness which the Syrian people possess for the great Soviet Union, a faithful friend of Syria and of all nations of the world fighting for liberty and social progress.

"The situation in the Near East," Ali Baddur noted, "is typified by growth in the intensity of attacks by American imperialism together with international Zionism and the Egyptian regime with the goal of imposing its dominance over the countries of this region. But the people of Syria will not be placed on their knees! They are fully resolved to foil the intrigues of reaction... Our country is a champion of the unity and togetherness of all progressive nationalist patriotic forces in the Near East, and of reinforcement of cooperation with all countries of socialism, and with the forces of progress and freedom headed by the great Soviet Union.

"Syria will continue to carry high its banner of the struggle for complete and conclusive liberation of occupied Arab territories, for implementation of the legal national rights of the Arab people of Palestine for self determination and for creation of an independent national state," the leader of the Syrian delegation emphasized. "We are deeply certain in the victory of our just cause, since the forces of progress, freedom, and socialism are on our side.

"We impatiently await Syrian President Comrade Hafiz al-Assad's visit to the Soviet Union, which is planned for the first half of October of this year," said Ali Baddur in conclusion. "We hope that this visit will produce important, qualitatively new results in the work of deepening the friendship between our peoples, a guarantee of which lies in the entire history of the development of relations between Syria and the Soviet Union."

11004
CSO: 1807

INTERNATIONAL

CONCEPT OF "CENTERS OF POWER" IN LATIN AMERICA ASSESSED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 80 signed to press 8 Jul 80
pp 5-19

[Article by V. P. Lukin: The Concept of 'Centers of Power' and Latin America]

[Text] Among the bourgeois concepts of international relations which have exerted an influence on the foreign policy of the leading imperialist powers during the 1970's, perhaps the greatest success has been enjoyed by the doctrine of the "multi-polar" world. This doctrine was developed by the leading political scientists of the United States at the turn of the 1970's and energetically supported and adopted by their colleagues in the other major capitalist countries.

This concept was formulated in the streambed of the widespread theory of "political realism," which for a long period of time has occupied a dominant position in the foreign-policy thinking of the ruling circles of the leading imperialist states. Taking its sources from an early European heritage (in particular, the works of N. Machiavelli), this school at the present time is most intensively and systematically represented in modern-day materials in the United States. Its most important representatives are H. Morgenthau, G. Kennan, H. Kissinger, S. Hoffman, and R. Osgood. Along with the French (R. Aron, A. Boffre, M. Tatu), British (M. Beloff, P. Calvocoressi, A. Backen), West German (K. Karstens, W. Fuchs, E. Maniok), and Japanese (K. Wakaizumi, M. Kosaka) advocates of "realistic politics," it is precisely these researchers who have created that intellectual atmosphere within which the strategic doctrines of the West have been formed and its long-range foreign-policy orientation has emerged. Of course, "political realism," in spite of its widespread adoption, is not the only foreign-policy theoretical concept of the ruling circles of the leading capitalist powers. And, although new doctrines began to appear in the mid-1970's (the so-called "trilateral philosophy," whose principal ideologist is Z. Brzezinski), lately in the foreign-policy concepts of the White House there is being felt more and more noticeably the latent influence of "realistic politics."

The fundamental postulate of the concept of "political realism" is the thesis that the immanent meaning and contents of the foreign-policy orientation

of every state is self-assertion in the form of a struggle for power and influence, identifiable, in the final analysis, with the realization of the state's "national interests." "The striving for power on the part of several nations, each of which is attempting to preserve or overthrow the status quo, conditions the necessity of the configuration which is called the balance of power, as well as the policy which pursues the goal of maintaining this balance," writes Professor H. Morgenthau, recognized as the leading authority in the sphere of "Realpolitik."¹ "A nation does not have a choice between a balance of power and some other kind of rational policy. It has only a choice between a balance of power and nothing," he explains in another one of his works.²

In determining a state's "national strength," Morgenthau sets out nine categories, which in a summarized form, appear as follows.

Geographical position. The geography of the Alps, for example, made it extremely difficult to invade Central Europe from Italy, whereas it was always much easier to invade Italy from the North. This played a large role in Italy's northern neighbors maintaining control over it during the course of several centuries.

Natural resources. Countries which have a guaranteed supply of foodstuffs and raw materials are capable of more effectively carrying out their "national goals" in time of war.

Industrial potential. The presence of sufficient raw material supplies and mineral reserves is of little importance in and by itself unless it is implemented in the form of industrial production.

Military preparedness. Military technology, the quantity and quality of the armed forces, along with the quality of their leadership--all this is one of the most important factors conditioning the capability of a state to conduct an active foreign policy.

Population. The conduct of modern war requires a large population in order to carry out the necessary functions, including industrial and agricultural production, transportation, and military operations.

National character. The population's cultural inclinations and antipathies affect the country's possibilities for mobilizing military forces and ensuring their fighting capacity, as well as for carrying out all kinds of activities relating to the utilization of the "national strength."

National morale. Its status determines the support by the nation of the policy of its state under the conditions of war and peace.

Quality of diplomacy. Diplomacy is the art of combining various elements of "national strength" in order to achieve foreign-policy goals.

quality of government. The government must skilfully direct the country's public opinion so that its policy will be supported.'

Marxist literature includes a number of interesting works containing well-grounded criticisms of the concept of "political realism." The principal methodological weakness of this theory consists of its inability to subject the concept of "national strength" This leads the adherents of the concept under discussion to absolutize the structure and the forms of the relations between states and to neglect the socio-historical meaning of these ties.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the concept of "political realism" constitutes one of the varieties of bourgeois-rationalistic theories, and, as such, it conflicts with any kind of openly idealistic construct in the sphere of international relations (such, for example, as the theory of "divine predestination"). On a more practical level, the concept of "political realism" became in the early 1970's the intellectual framework within which were shaped the most realistic forms of adapting contemporary capitalism to the imperatives of world politics during the present period. In particular, it was precisely these "political realists" who constructively responded to the initiatives of the socialist states in the sphere of international detente.

A principal, up-to-date variant of the theory of "balance of power" is the assertion that the world is in a stage of transition from "bi-polar" to "multi-polar." If the first postwar period was characterized by the presence of, and conflict between, the two major powers--the Soviet Union and the United States, from the 1960's on this "bi-polar" world structure has begun, in the opinion of the "political realists," to be deformed.

In analyzing this "deformation," they combine together such factors on various levels as the break made by the Chinese leadership with the world socialist system and the assertion in the international arena of the great-power, chauvinistic, hegemonic "Chinese factor"; the processes of economic and political integration among the Western-European capitalist states, from which derives the possibility of the future formation of a united "Western-European center of power"; the rapid economic development of Japan and the efforts of the Japanese to follow a political course which would correspond to this country's "new status" as one of the centers of world capitalism.

Generous tribute to this "multi-polar" concept has been paid by many of the foremost political leaders of the imperialist states. Thus, former U.S. president R. Nixon declared as follows in 1972: "I think that this would be a safer and better world if we had a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, Japan, China, balancing each other." This declaration relies on the conclusions of H. Kissinger, drawn from his many years of meditations: "A world which has several centers for adopting decisions is fully compatible with our (American--V.L.) interests as well as with our ideals."⁵

Among the advocates of the "multi-polar" (or, as it is sometimes called, the "five-polar") concept there are considerable variations regarding the concrete contents of the relations among the various "centers of power," the magnitude of the asymmetry hindering the optimal functioning of the "multi-polar balance of forces," to what extent the individual "centers of power" are "global" and to what extent--"regional" factors.

Thus, the American researchers W. Kintner and M. Kaplan consider as a mandatory condition of the full functioning of such a "five-polar system" the presence in each of the principal "centers of power" of a sufficiently developed strategic potential. And inasmuch as such a potential is completely lacking in the case of Japan and is "not full" in the case of two other "centers of power"--Western Europe and China, we must draw the conclusion that the "five-polar model" is only a more or less distant future prospect, but scarcely a reality.⁶

This point of view is disputed by those who consider that at the present time the concept of "national strength" includes those components which may, to a considerable extent, compensate for purely military factors, also including military-strategic weaknesses. A number of Japanese "political realists" have recently begun to use more and more actively the concept of "econopolitics."⁷ This term is usually interpreted as a method of attaining the goals of "national greatness" under conditions whereby the "military component" of such greatness are lacking. In other words, according to the advocates of this variant, under the conditions of the present-day strategic parity or "military bi-polarity" it is completely possible to attain a "political multi-polarity" by means of actively utilizing various kinds of non-military (primarily economic and scientific-technical) means as an instrument of foreign-policy influence.

There is also a compromise school, the representatives of which consider that at the present time the world is in transition from a "bi-polar" to a "tri-polar" phase, inasmuch as only the PRC is gradually beginning to meet the principal parameters for a "center of power." As regards the Western European complex, which is being integrated, and Japan, for various reasons they have still not reached the appropriate stage, and, consequently, their transition to the ranks of "centers of power" is a matter for the final decades of the present century.

All these constructs are marked by an extremely theoretical nature and a more associative than a rigorously analytical approach to the complex and contradictory international political reality of the second half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, in an extremely specific form they do reflect an important tendency of the present time: the relative decrease by virtue of the action of the law of the uneven development of capitalism of the U.S. share in the world economy and politics and, correspondingly, the economic augmentation and political activation of the Western European and Japanese centers of capitalism. At the same time, the concept described above attempts to elucidate and, so to speak, to legitimize, to make as respectable as possible the "organic" registration in the "world community" of Chinese great-power hegemonism.

The "multi-polar" concept has yet another dimension, which is particularly important within the context of the present article. Its apologists are far from considering the "five-polar world" to be the final result of the "play of world forces." In the long-term future they foresee a further augmentation of the number of "poles of power."

This question began to be debated with particular intensity after the period of 1973-74, when the petroleum-exporting countries were able to give a decisive rebuff to the imperialist powers and created a new atmosphere in the relations between young, independent states and their former colonial masters. Amid these complicated circumstances the "political realists" activated their previously begun quests for potential "centers of power" among the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In order to make these quests less exotic and more relevant to the concrete foreign-policy activity, the term "regional centers of power" was introduced into the lexicon of "Realpolitik." From among the developed capitalist states these include sometimes Australia and the Republic of South Africa.

On a more systematic level Western researchers single out certain regions where in the future local "balances of power" will be formed. These include the Near and Middle East, the region of the Red Sea, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the southern part of the Pacific Ocean region, Africa "south of the Sahara," the South Atlantic region, including states on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean—African as well as Latin American. As may be seen, together with regions representing a traditional interest for the leading imperialist countries, their foreign-policy planning includes regions which will have a "future importance," where, in other words, complexes of world politics will intertwine at the turn of the century.

As "regional centers of power" mention is usually made of Iran (prior to the anti-Shah revolution of 1979--80), Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, India, and Indonesia. Along with these states the "political realists" are actively discussing the possible emergence as intermediate "centers of power" of two "candidates" from among the Latin American countries. From the mid-1960's on Brazil has become a favorite such candidate, joined in this category by Mexico since the late 1970's.

For quite a long time now Brazil has been regarded as an extremely important, potential, "middle-level center" not only in Latin America but also in the zone of the developing countries as a whole. The present-day conceptual spokesman of American official foreign policy, Z. Brzezinski, declared that this country has greater chances to become a "superpower" in the future than Japan by virtue of a better combination of population, resources, geographical position, and historical past.⁸

"At least by the end of the century Brazil will be one of the great world powers," writes the well-known American scholar, R. Alexander. "Its population will reach 200 million, and it will become one of the world's chief

industrial countries. In all probability, it will become a nuclear power. It is unlikely that Brazil would refrain from utilizing its economic, political, and military power.⁹ Such pronouncements create around the "Brazilian phenomenon" a unique kind of atmosphere of "heightened expectations," which in and by itself is one of the important factors of Brazilian foreign policy, as well as the attitudes of various parts of the world towards this country.

Such an atmosphere constitutes, however, only the surface layer under which are hidden numerous "solid" geopolitical research studies, conducted in Brazil itself as well as far beyond its borders, describing scenes of this country's future as a "great power" by means of utilizing a great deal of factual material, dug up from economic, scientific-technical, and military-strategic areas.

As a rule, these works note that Brazil occupies fifth place in the world with respect to territory and seventh place with respect to population, that its GNP in 1977 reached the impressive figure of 164.4 billion dollars, that it has considerably surpassed other Latin American states with regard to saturation by the latest means of production, by the machine-worker ratio of industrial enterprises, by the scope of scientific research and experimental design. The following factors are also mentioned as "prospective" material grounds for transforming Brazil into a "center of power": the high level of concentration and monopolization of production and capital; a "statist" economic model, which allows the political leadership to effect broad maneuvers with the country's economic potential in the interests of carrying out a definite foreign-policy program; the presence of enormous hydro resources, making it possible to partially compensate for the shortage of petroleum; a program of accelerated development (in close cooperation with the PNE) of nuclear power engineering.

By combining these factors and certain other data in a specific manner, the advocates of the doctrine of "centers of power" allot to Brazil all the basic objective attributes of a "great power of the 21st century."

Emphasis in this area has also been accorded by the U.S. researchers of international relations and futurologists. Herman Kahn and his colleagues include Brazil, along with Mexico, among the most dynamic countries of Latin America with good future prospects.¹⁰ Ray Cline, having made in his book "World Power Assessment" a geopolitical breakdown of the world into 11 "polytectonic zones," elevates Brazil to a position among the "natural leaders" of the ninth, South American zone;¹¹ Albert Fishlow in his article, dedicated to American-Brazilian relations in the influential journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS, states that in the early 1980's the slogan "Grandezza" will no longer be an empty word for Brazil.¹²

This line of American geopolitical political science is closely connected with the long-term quests of the ideologists of Brazil's military-technocratic ruling elite. The precursors of present-day Brazilian geopolitics

H. Travassos and A. Bokheler, were the direct disciples and interpreters (with adaptations to local conditions) of the concepts of those pillars of North American "political realism," A. Mackinder and A. Speakman. With the direct participation of the United States a Military College was established in 1949, and it was here that the present-day generation of Brazilian geopoliticians was formed, such as General Meira Matos and Golbery de Couto e Silva.

The principal result of this generation's activity was the development of the so-called "doctrine of national security, which, to a considerable extent, determined the ideological orientation of the military regime, established in 1964.

As regards foreign-policy problems, the above-mentioned doctrine may be reduced at the present time to the following four basic ideas:

--an emphasis on the future, proceeding from the fact that Brazil represents an enormous country, possessing inexhaustible resources, and this opens before it unlimited possibilities for developing and creating the "power components" of a great-power foreign policy;

--accents on the universal importance of a "new, multi-racial and tropical culture," capable of making a substantial contribution to softening the conflicts between the developed and the developing countries, between "North" and "South," between whites and blacks;

--an insistence upon the success of the "Brazilian model" of economic development, based upon a combination of harsh measures to maintain the so-called "domestic stability" with an attraction of foreign sources in order to expand production, in other words, propaganda for the model of authoritarian capitalist development;

--exalted praise of pragmatic nationalism, keying exclusively on the so-called "national interests," treated very flexibly depending on the changing foreign-policy conditions.

Such an interpretation of Brazilian "national interests" or "national security" was not, of course, developed all at once. During the years 1964--1967 the predominant motif of official Brazilian geopolitics was on the theoretical level an emphasis on belonging to "Western civilization," and on a practical level--the diplomacy of an open and demonstrative equality with the United States.

Brazil's "relative autonomy" as a "center of power" has been treated by the theoreticians of the military-technocratic elite on three basic levels.

On the first, it is a matter of the global-political plane. On this level one may hear more and more often the version of Brazil as a country-wide embodiment of the "international middle class."¹³ This association, which is

superficial and extremely far from the genuine scientific content, derived from the fact that Brazil as a whole, on a country-wide level, with regard to its per capita national income stands, so to speak, at an intermediate stage between the "poor" and the "rich" nations and, consequently, objectively occupies the best position as an intermediary between the former and the latter. It is not within the task of the present article to make a critical analysis of the social or ideological meaning of the above-mentioned formula. It is important to note that it constitutes one of the "conceptual foundations" of the present-day maneuvering of Brazilian foreign policy among the developed capitalist and the developing countries, as well as an effort to "identify itself" at this marginal level.

On the second level, Brazil's entrance into membership at the "great powers" club" is closely linked with the military-strategic level. And although certain Brazilian internationalists have stated in this regard that the "national security depends more on the country's total potential than on its purely military might,"¹⁴ in fact, the "politics of greatness" accords considerable attention to military factors.

On the third level, the assertion of Brazil as a "center of power" is presented on a classically geopolitical plane. The following two trends are considered most often in the expansion of the new "center of power": 1) the Latin American and the South Atlantic, 2) the African.

In the works which are considered to be the classic expressions of the Brazilian geopolitical school one can frequently encounter the term 'buffer states,' as applied to such neighbors of Brazil as Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. The decade just past was marked by a significant increase of the penetration by Brazilian capital into the economies of these countries. Also widely known are the efforts to introduce the "Brazilian model" among the states of the 'southern cone.' During the period when the Republican administration was in power in the United States the tendency to disseminate Brazil's influence to the countries adjoining it acquired official support and became a component part of the strategy of "sub-imperialism."

As regards the remote strategical prospects, the Brazilian geopoliticians see growing possibilities in connection with the active assimilation of the Parana River Basin in the South, political prospects for the integrated assimilation of the La Plata Basin and the Amazon Basin, which means 'combining the movement to the West, to the Pacific coast, with a movement to the North, to the Caribbean Sea.'¹⁵ It was precisely within such a context that they regarded the "Amazon Pact," concluded in 1978. In recent years, however, the concepts of expansion in these sub-regions are being replaced more and more by concepts of cooperation with the states adjacent to it for the joint assimilation of these territories. The southern part of the Atlantic Ocean is considered as yet another "natural" direction for the thrust of predominant Brazilian influence.

In his principal work, "The Geopolitics of Brazil," General Golbery do Couto e Silva, perhaps the leading advocate of the expansionist trend under consideration and one of former president Geisel's most influential political advisers, provided the following grounds for the 'South Atlantic Strategic Option': "Inasmuch as geography has accorded to the Brazilian coast and its protruding northeastern position an almost monopolistic dominance in the South Atlantic, this Brazilian monopoly should be carried out exclusively by us."¹⁶ It is precisely here that Couto e Silva and his likeminded associates see the main, future development of Brazilian geopolitical expansion, a unique Brazilian variant of the North American "manifest destiny." Closely linked with efforts to approach the realization of this "destiny" in the future is the stepped-up naval shipbuilding as well as a purposive rapprochement with a number of states in West Africa, reinforced by expanding the export to this region of Brazilian products. But changes are to be observed in this trend of Brazilian foreign policy also. Interest in the idea of a South Atlantic Military Bloc (SATO) has noticeably diminished, and the initial concept, linked with a rapprochement with the Republic of South Africa (RSA) (which subscribed to the openly pro-American orientation of the mid-1960's), has now turned out to be greatly altered in form.

And thus, from the viewpoint of the heralds of a "multi-polar world," Brazil constitutes the principal, best-defined, and prospective Latin American "center of power." Some persons consider this country as an "intermediate link and regional center," while others view it as a potential "global center" (along with the USSR, the United States, the PRC, and India).¹⁷ Some regard the characteristics of a "power center" as already within the contemporary Brazilian foreign-policy course, others are thinking more about the 21st century. All, however, adhere to the opinion that Brazil's international influence in the future will increase substantially regardless of specific circumstances.

Also noted at the end of the 1960's were definite changes in the approach, which led to the formation of the concept, formulated by certain Western observers as the "diplomacy of prosperity," within the framework of which the country's ruling circles began to exert tangible resistance to the tendency to the "Canadization" of Brazil.

The early 1970's were marked by a further growth of autonomous-nationalistic tendencies and by the formation of the doctrine of rejecting "automatic alliances"; this presupposed the liquidation of any sort of rigid treaty obligations and untying the hands for unleashing activities in all directions, in accordance with the national interests.

And finally, in the second half of the decade just past, the Brazilian regime formulated the doctrine of the "diplomacy of responsible pragmatism," which was called upon to ensure Brazil's emergence as a new "center of power" within the present-day situation, which is characterized by a weakening of U. S. positions within the capitalist system and a strengthening of the positions of socialism and the national-liberation movement in relationship to world capitalism as a whole.

As the German researcher Wolf Grabendorff has emphasized, in the present phase "it is a matter of the forms of conduct by an assertive nation which is striving in an extremely purposive way to introduce its own concepts into the sphere of international politics and which knows how to utilize in this connection its own geopolitical position as a relatively autonomous "center of power."¹⁸

In practice this led to extremely important shifts in the accents of Brazilian foreign policy under the governments of Geisel and then--very markedly--under that of Figueiredo.¹⁹ These changes occurred in Brazil's relations with practically all the regions and countries of the world; moreover, they were not at all within the framework of those forecasts which had been constructed in Washington during the mid-1960's.

During the most recent period Mexico has been put forth more and more frequently as the second Latin American "center of power." Brazil regards Mexico as the natural alternative pole in its policy regarding Latin America, inasmuch as both these states, being the principal poles of economic development in the region, have attained the level of countries standing on the threshold of joining the group of developed countries and, accordingly, the category of 'new influential members' of the international system.²⁰

Such estimates of Mexico's prospects have become a very widespread phenomenon only in the last two or three years and, naturally, do not have "intellectual scope," as compared to estimates of Brazil's future. It was not too long ago that the North American geopoliticians were convinced of the fact that Mexico's being the direct neighbor of the United States automatically excluded the former from any sort of serious participation in the "world balance." Thus, the above-mentioned R. Cline includes Mexico in the first "polytectonic zone," where it is placed in a modest third (next-to-last) place with a considerable gap not only from the United States but also from Canada.²¹

At the present time, however, the situation has changed radically. "Having broken the old tradition of indifference with regard to Mexico, the American government during the last two years has transformed it into an object of particular attention. The reasons for this are both economic and political; taken together, they constitute the foundation of new realities and schemes of relations which have no precedents," states a prominent Mexican political observer.²²

Such increased attention to Mexico's prospects has been conditioned by the following three major considerations.

First, persons in the United States note that during the two decades just past Mexico's economic development under conditions of relative political stability (a phenomenon extremely rare for a Latin American country) has been quite dynamic. This has allowed the ruling factions to acquire quite substantial material levers for carrying out an activated foreign policy.

It is estimated that by the beginning of the 21st century Mexico, which by that time will have a population of 135 million, will be transformed into a developed country with a significant economic potential.

Second, a number of researchers on both sides of the American-Mexican border are now coming to the conclusion that Mexico's geographic proximity with the United States is gradually ceasing to be a one-sided positive asset for Washington and a negative one for Mexico. Here, among a number of reasons, top priority is accorded to the constant and rapid increase in the number of persons of Mexican descent living in the United States. At the present time they already number about 20 million (including 8 million voters). By the end of the present century this group will become, it is considered, the most numerous and politically influential ethnic minority in the United States, and this means that Mexico will become an exceptionally important factor not only in the foreign policy but also in the domestic policy of the United States. And, finally, third,--and,obviously, at the present time this is the most important dynamic factor in the re-evaluation of Mexico's prospective "power" role--in the United States and other countries of the capitalist world extraordinary repercussions were caused by the news about the discovery and development in Mexico of very large petroleum deposits.

This last circumstance has assumed particular importance under the conditions of the growing petroleum shortage and the recalcitrant attitude towards the West on the part of the OPEC countries. The scope of the officially confirmed (37 billion barrels) and probable (200 billion barrels) petroleum reserves will indeed place Mexico in the near future among the world's leading petroleum-producing countries. If we add to this the enormous reserves of natural gas and uranium ore, the country becomes for the neighboring United States a genuine warehouse of energy of exceptional economic and strategic importance.

As regards Mexico itself, for it the discovery of such huge petroleum deposits constitutes a hope not only to extricate itself from the present extremely complex economic situation but also from its overall status of weak development and dependency, a powerful means for a decisive surge towards a higher phase of economic development. Mexican economists assume, in particular, that the profits from petroleum, which by 1983 will comprise about 11 billion dollars, may allow the country to settle its debts, improve the conditions for the granting of international credits, basically solve the problem of industrialization and create new, extremely necessary jobs.

Because of deeply rooted traditions and strategic calculations it is difficult for academic circles as well as political leaders in the United States to become accustomed to the thought that directly adjacent to its territory a "center of power" may be forming which possesses large, independent economic and political potentials, and, moreover, serious levers for affecting the North American domestic political process. If in the case of Brazil there exists in general either a conviction of the feasibility, from the viewpoint of Washington's interests, in the formation of this "center of power," or,

at least, a recognition of the impossibility of halting this process, similar prospects ascribed to Mexico are considered negative and subject to "neutralization." This question may be posed more concretely in the following manner: how to realize Mexican energy resources in the interests of the United States and, moreover, not to allow Mexico to utilize its own petroleum, including its deliveries to the United States, in order to strengthen its own independence, get out from under American economic and political influence, and in the future--to acquire an alternative weight in the regions of Central America and the Caribbean Basin--a traditional sphere of Washington's monopolistic domination.

American strategists are attempting to find the answer to this question in the policy of "North American integration." This course, which was embodied in Presidential Memorandum No. 41, which was drawn up on the occasion of President Carter's visit to Mexico in May 1977, provides for the future "merging of the economies" of the United States, Mexico, and Canada into a unified complex. Naturally, such a variant would ultimately transform Mexico into a raw-material appendage of the United States and would deprive it of any sort of political maneuverability at all.

Judging by the development of events during the last few years, this is perfectly well understood in Mexico. "For Mexico the question is as follows: either it will become a powerful industrial power by the end of this century or it will miss its historical chance and will always remain an appendage of its great neighbor," stated the country's President Lopez Portillo.²³

The Mexican side rejected the two variants of "economic integration" which were proposed by Washington. The country's leaders proceeded from the fact that the petroleum lever ought to become a weapon of constant and intensive pressure on the United States, an instrument for increasing Mexico's political weight in the zone of developing states as well as within the framework of world capitalism.

Of course, the two tendencies cited above--"integration" or an orientation aimed at creating a "center of power," representing the ideological reflection of one of the new forms of conflict between American monopolies and the increasingly stronger national bourgeoisie of Mexico--are only in outline, and it is still difficult to predict the outcome of this struggle. It is obvious, however, that the ideas relating to the transformation of Mexico into a second Latin American "center of power" constitute a reflection of new and extremely important realities.

The dissemination of the concept of a "multi-polar world" to the Latin American continent is a well-marked tendency. Regardless of the contents of the respective constructs, they are objectively becoming some of the symptoms of the final eradication of the complex of "Latin American provincialism" both in the brain centers of the leading imperialist states as well as in the Latin American countries themselves, one of the manifestations of an increasingly active grappling by these countries with the central questions of contemporary world politics.

Nevertheless, the militant support by several extremely influential circles of the political elite of a number of large Latin American states of the imperialist concept of "centers of power" with its essential reliance on a militarized balance relative to each other as an acceptable "realistic" interpretation of the structure of international relations today and tomorrow represents an extremely dangerous tendency. Dangerous primarily for these countries themselves, for to attempt to provide grounds for their foreign-policy course with the aid of the above-mentioned doctrine means essentially to proceed along the path of weakening political dependence while maintaining intellectual dependence. But practical experience has shown that new wine poured into old wineskins loses many of its best qualities.

The formulas of the doctrine of "centers of power" essentially ignore the basic changes which have taken place in the world during the second half of the 20th century. They emphasize and absolutize the tendencies towards egotistical national isolationism in the world, the indivisibility and interdependence of which is becoming more and more tangible and filled with specific material contents. This is why the fully understandable and natural strivings of many of the world's states, which have liberated themselves or are attempting to liberate themselves from various forms of foreign dependence, may most fully and successfully realize their aspirations not on the paths of borrowing decayed, age-old, imperialist doctrines, but on the paths of seeking out such forms of collective communalities which would block the militarization of the economy, tendencies to acquire one's own "sphere of influence," and various types of internecine conflicts. In other words, it is a matter of seeking out ways of increasingly active participation by the young developing states--both large and small--in the quest for effective means of attaining collective security for all peoples.

FOOTNOTES

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INTERNATIONAL

FACTORS INFLUENCING CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

/Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 80 pp 20-38/

/Article by I. K. Sheremet'ev: "Foreign and Domestic Factors in Capitalist Development"/

/Excerpts/ Soviet scholars on Latin America have recently conducted a great deal of work on studying the principles and characteristics of the emergence and development of the capitalist mode of production in the Latin American countries.

One of the questions which has attracted widespread attention and has served for grounds for discussion is the question of the correlations between and the role of foreign and domestic factors. Its essence consists of to what extent capitalism in these countries has been the product of an autochthonous development and to what extent--the result of foreign forces influencing them: the world capitalist economic system, its principal centers--the industrial developed states with their numerous levers of influence on the peripheral, economically backward countries. Of considerable interest here is the explanation of at what stages and under what conditions the role of external factors increased in the region's capitalist development and to what results this led. And, on the other hand, when and under what specifically historical circumstances the balance tipped to the side of the internal factors of this evolution. Of course, analysis of this problem also requires an examination of the interrelationships between these groups of factors, inasmuch as in real life they act not in isolation but as a certain unity of forces of socioeconomic development, although they also lead to far different results.

Sources of Dependent Capitalist Development

The great geographical discoveries and the ensuing conquest by European colonialists of the territories of the New World put an end to the isolated natural-historical development of the ancient civilizations which had existed here. The trends and character of the socioeconomic evolution of the Latin American countries from this time on began to be determined not only by internal but also by external factors, by shifts in the world economic system as a whole at every phase of its development.

Along with the colonial countries of Asia and Africa, Latin America became a rich source of primary accumulation for the motherland states of the Old World.

Under the conditions whereby a substantial part of the surplus product created by the labor of the enslaved native population in one form or another was exported to the European countries and along with this there existed various types of direct bans on economic activity in the colonies, the economic development of the latter suffered a clearly expressed detrimental character.

The winning in the early 19th century of formal political independence by many countries of this continent, which brought with it the abolition of all kinds of requisitions in favor of the motherland states as well as direct bans and limitations on economic activity, undoubtedly created more favorable preconditions for their economic progress.

And, nevertheless, the emergence of capitalist forms of doing business in the region proceeded weakly and slowly right up to the end of the 19th century. The principal internal reason for this was the preservation here of the socioeconomic structure of society which had been inherited from the colonial past and which had not undergone any substantial changes during the course of the war for independence.

The role of the external factor in determining the tendencies and forms of economic development of the Latin American countries grew unevenly at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries in connection with important qualitative changes in the economic basis of the leading industrial states of the capitalist world and throughout the entire system of world economic ties. The basis for these changes was the transition by capitalism from a free competition to a monopolistic and then to a state-monopolistic capitalism, the deepening of the international capitalist division of labor, and the development of massive exports of "surplus" capital from the industrial states to the economically backward countries.

Under the influence of the rapidly developing world capitalist market and the extensive penetration into the countries of this region of foreign capital, there was a sharp intensification of the dualistic nature of their economies, represented, on the one hand, by a developed single-commodity export sector of the economy, and on the other hand--by the "traditional sector"--by those sectors and structures which were developing within the framework of national markets which were narrowly based, disconnected, and bound by very powerful vestiges of the past.

In the economy's export sector, and primarily in its main branches--the mining (including petroleum) industry and plantation agriculture,--the dominant position was occupied by foreign capital.

Nevertheless, within individual units of the economy's export sector of the Latin American countries favorable conditions were formed for a more

rapid accumulation of monetary capital in the hands of certain members of the native ruling classes.

During the second half of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century important changes occurred in the labor market of a number of Latin American countries. A new source for recruiting it opened up in the form of a mass influx of population from other regions, and primarily from Western European states.

Immigration played a large and, at the same time, an uneven role in the socioeconomic development of individual Latin American countries.⁶ The mass of settlers was far from homogeneous with regard to its social composition. Among the immigrants were quite a few artisans, traders, and simply wheeler-dealers of various stripes who knew how to scrape together some monetary capital in their homelands and to make profitable use of it in the places where they newly settled. Such types of colonists served as a unique social milieu for the formation of the first detachments of a national bourgeoisie both in agriculture (bourgeois types of farmers) as well as in the sphere of trade and industry. Later on, as the so-called import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) process developed, some of them became big industrialists and financiers.

Nevertheless, the category of colonists mentioned above represented only a small sub-stratum within the total mass of immigrants. Most of them were made up of the proletarianized population of the Western European countries.

In comparison with the native population, which had been oppressed by the feudal-serfdom system, this was a qualitatively different work force, better suited for the conditions of commercial capitalist production.

Effort to Mobilise Internal Resources at the Stage of Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI)

Having become by the beginning of the 20th century an integrated part of the world capitalist economy, Latin America turned out to be within the sphere of activity of its inherent principles and contradictions. The pace and proportions of its economic growth, the possibilities for accumulating and satisfying the demands for industrial goods, including the means of production, began to depend as never before on the state of affairs in the world capitalist market, on the levels of demand and prices for the principal export commodities--mineral and agricultural raw materials, as well as certain foodstuff items.

Since the 1930's a period has begun in the socioeconomic development of the Latin American countries which is characterized by attempts to re-structure the national economy on the basis of speeding up the development of the native processing industry, strengthening the economic positions of the state, and a greater mobilization of internal potentials. This

turning-point was, to no small degree, linked with the activities of the bourgeois-nationalist forces in a number of the region's countries, with an intensified influence on the state's economic policy by the national, and in particular, by the individual, bourgeoisie.

During the 1940's the reinforcement of these tendencies was facilitated by the extraordinary conditions of wartime: the curtailment of the possibilities for purchasing industrial goods abroad, the temporary weakening of competitive pressure from the monopolies in the warring imperialist states, etc.

The course of the forced development of the native industry began to be regarded as virtually a panacea for all the ailments with which the agrarian-raw-material economy was suffering. The bourgeois reformists saw in it a means capable within the framework of the capitalist alternative, with the cooperation of foreign capital, of transforming the structure of the national economy, of lessening the economic dependence on the industrial, capitalist states, of insuring a more widespread utilization of national resources, and of softening the sharpness of social problems. Considerable efforts were applied to impart a dynamic nature to this process, in the course of which they would solve the problem of saturating the domestic markets with industrial items of their own manufacture but would also open up an egress with them onto the foreign, world capitalist market. In the final analysis, realism dispelled the illusion of import-substitution industrialization. The goals and means of attaining it proved to be irreconcilably contradictory.

Moreover, it could be asserted that precisely substitution industrialization as a result was a factor in exacerbating the external and internal problems which it claimed to provide the solution for.

Import-substitution industrialization, extended for at least three decades and still not accomplished in many countries even today, complicated the economic structure of these countries. It facilitated the strengthening of the positions in the national economy of private-enterprise capitalism, the formation and elevation of the financial-oligarchical groups connected with industrial activity and which used for purposes of profit the numerous privileges of the policy of encouraging import-substitution production. Its other important result was the development of state capitalism and its transformation into an organic component of the economic system of many countries in this region.

Already in the first phases of import-substitution industrialization there arose the need for a broader interference of the state in the process of socioeconomic development. It was confronted with a task of a dual nature: on the one hand, to create more favorable general economic conditions for the growth of industry, and on the other hand,--to stimulate private enterprise and capitalist accumulation in the industrial sector and, in particular, in new branches of production. The solution of the first part of the problem brought with it an expansion of the scope of entrepreneurial and

financial-investment activity by the state in the sphere of production services and in certain basic branches of industrial production.

The emergence and development of the state sector of the economy in the Latin American countries proceeded both by "peaceful," evolutionary paths and under circumstances of extremely acute struggle. In the first instance state enterprises were created and functioned side by side with private ones (national and foreign), supplementing the latter by means of their activities. In the second instance the state sector was formed as a result of a sharp exacerbation of conflicts with foreign monopolies, in the course of a struggle to strengthen the foundations of national independence.

The development of the state sector in the Latin American countries is a principled and progressive phenomenon. To a considerable extent it now insures the expansion of the fuel-power and raw-material base in the countries of this region, the creation of a number of branches and production facilities, gradually changing the economic profile of this region, determining its future production-economic specialization. This, however, does not exclude the possibility in certain specific instances (in individual countries, branches, and units of the economy) of abandonment of the general principle, of twisting its activity in favor of private-enterprise capitalism, foreign monopolies, or, finally, its subordination and adaptation to the interests of the latter. A great deal here depends on the nature of the state regime, on the ideological positions and socioeconomic policy of the ruling circles. Not everywhere did nationalization prove to be a consistent and effective measure in the plan of strengthening the foundations of national independence, as well as the rational utilization of natural and labor resources in the genuinely national interests.

Linked with the course of encouraging industrial development were important changes in the structure of the credit and banking system of the Latin American countries, to be precise, the appearance of a special type of credit centers-state banks for development. A number of important industrial enterprises in the region's countries are obliged to a large extent for their emergence to these state banks for development. Within the system of state measures directed at stimulating industrial growth, in addition to direct interference in social production, a large role was played and continues to be played by all manner of indirect methods of influencing the processes of accumulating and distributing capital among the various branches and sectors of the economy, as well as among economic regions. Among these methods protectionism deserves special mention.

Protectionism played an extremely contradictory role in this region's industrial development. It was indisputably one of the important factors in the industrialization of the Latin American countries. While creating a substantial gap between the level of domestic prices and the prices of the world capitalist market on individual groups of industrial items produced within the borders of these countries, protectionism, at the same time, facilitated an increase in the norms of profits in the corresponding branches of domestic

production, and also brought about an influx of additional capital in them. This, however, led to well-known paradoxes. On the one hand, there was an increase in the monopolisation of production and the domestic market. On the other hand, protectionism, since it created "hothouse" conditions on the domestic market, facilitated the survival of small-scale enterprises with low technical levels, high production costs, and other economic minuses. In other words, it served as one of the factors in perpetuating the preservation of a multiple structure in the economy's industrial sector.

By the end of the 1960's the unfeasibility of import-substitution industrialization had been manifested on the level of solving one of its principal tasks -- lessening dependence on the importation of industrial goods and decreasing currency outlays for their purchase abroad. To this was added the precipitous growth of currency outlays in connection with the utilisation of foreign technical aid and technology in the new branches of the manufacturing industry (the purchase of licenses, patents, trademarks, and paying for the services of foreign specialists). This type of expenditure essentially cancelled out the "savings effect" of import-substitution industrialization, compelling the Latin American countries to turn again and again to the traditional sources for covering currency outlays for industrial exports, i.e., to exporting agricultural and mineral raw materials on a growing scale, as well as to foreign credits and loans.

Other no-less-serious contradictions of import-substitution industrialization were also revealed. Becoming a major problem was the ever-increasing backwardness of such a traditional sector as agriculture in relation to the new social requirements connected with the accelerated industrial growth and the stormy process of urbanisation. Many countries in this region began to feel particularly acute shortages of foodstuffs and to have recourse to their importation on a broad scale.

During the 1960's bourgeois-reformist circles in a number of this region's countries undertook attempts to pull agriculture up to the new conditions of social development by means of well-known agrarian reforms. The results of such reforms have now been determined with sufficient exactness.

The social problems of the Latin American countries also grew more complex during the course of import-substitution industrialisation. The most acute of these is the problem of finding jobs for the rapidly growing employable population. Industrialisation engendered the illusion of an expanded demand for manpower in the cities and thereby gave an impetus to the mass outpouring of "surplus" labor from the rural areas into the cities. The rational labor structure of the large masses of manpower in the cities has encountered, however, a number of obstacles raised by the capitalist nature of industrialisation. As the process of concentrating production and capital increased, especially in the dynamic sectors of the economy where the transnational corporations (TNC) have been active, the demand for manpower has relatively decreased. Moreover, big capital actively utilizes scientific and technical progress for the purpose of increasing profits with a minimum of additional

hiring of new manpower. Under such conditions the chances of obtaining work in large-scale, up-to-date production are possessed only by those groups of the employable population which have access to education and vocational-technical training. Nevertheless, large masses of laborers, deprived of such opportunities remain without jobs, outside of the framework of socially useful activity. They swell the army of the unemployed in the large cities or at best engage in low-productive work within the extensive sphere of services, which has been developed in a hypertrophied manner.

Activation of the Forces of Neo-colonialism

The 1960's and 1970's were marked by a new and serious shift in the correlation between the external and internal factors of this region's capitalist development. On a general level it was linked with the attempts of the leading capitalist states to renovate the system of capitalism's world economic ties by means of a well-known restructuring of their own relations with the developing countries, modernizing and adapting their economic structures to the new level of requirements of the principal centers of world capitalism for sources of raw material and energy, markets for the sale of finished goods, and spheres for the profitable interjection of the gigantically grown "surplus" capital. Ideological and political motives have been added in to an increasingly greater extent to the "purely economic" requirements of the imperialist powers. Placing the emphasis on modernizing the economic structures of the developing countries, on encouraging the development of national capitalism in them has brought about their self-interest in cooperating with the imperialist states, to diminish the white heat of the liberation struggle, and to make visible the prospects for solving their disturbing economic and social problems within the framework of the capitalist alternative of development.

A special role in carrying out the strategic goals of neo-colonialism in the developing countries is now being played by the giant monopolies, which have unleashed their activities on an international scale, creating a multi-branched network of their affiliates and subsidiary companies in the peripheral zones of world capitalism. When the economically backward countries became actively involved in the process of industrial development, these super-monopolies strove to direct such a process into channels which they themselves desired, to create a new, more camouflaged system of dependent relations which would allow them to exploit even further and more extensively the natural and labor resources of these countries. In carrying out such goals, diverse support was rendered to the TNC by the imperialist state.

The working out in the scientific research centers of the imperialist countries of neo-colonialist "models of development" and their application to the developing countries, the sending there of numerous advisers and consultants in order to carry out the practical implementation of such "models," the financial and other support of political regimes which facilitate the TNC's participation in the capitalist modernization of these countries--such is the far-from-complete enumeration of the levers of pressure exerted by the imperialist state on the developing countries, "supplementing" the activities of the TNCs.

Soviet economic literature has quite fully illuminated the question of the TNC's new role in modernizing the system of relations between the principal centers of capitalism and the developing countries; it has also revealed their impelling motives for the broad-scale, expansionist activity in the latter. The well-known Soviet scholar K. N. Brutets, for example, characterizes these changes in the following manner: "From the 1950's on, and more clearly in the 1960's, the imperialist circles began to understand the inevitability of economic progress and even industrial development of the liberated countries. On this basis an attempt was manifested to "nest" this irreversible process to a certain extent in order to place it under their own control. In other words, to impart to economic progress and industrial development by the young states forms acceptable for world imperialism and which preserve their dependence on it to the maximum possible degree under present-day conditions."¹⁰

Another Soviet scholar, V.V. Vol'skiy, touching upon the question of the prospects for industrial development by the group of countries under consideration in the light of the shifts which are occurring in the international capitalist division of labor and imperialism's new strategy, has expressed the following hypothetical opinion: "It is theoretically possible to imagine a situation whereby, if imperialism were to succeed in extending its days long enough, many presently agrarian countries would be turned into industrial pools, consisting of labor-consuming, dirty, hot, and arduous sectors, working for the motherlands, while these latter would become the suppliers of new technology, brain centers, and the largest producers of foodstuffs, on which the rest of the world would be dependent."¹¹

Latin America, perhaps, is the most obvious example of how through the mediation of the TNCs the above-mentioned tendencies are being carried out in the relations between the principal centers of capitalism and the developing countries. And it vividly demonstrates to what negative consequences the participation of foreign monopolies in the capitalist modernization of the national economies of such countries leads.

Since the 1960's the economic, and particularly the industrial, development of the Latin American region has been accompanied by an incursion, unprecedented in its scope and depth, of the TNCs in the newest sectors of the economy--into metallurgy and metal-processing, transport machine building, the chemical and petrochemical industry, the production of synthetic materials, electric-appliance and electronic apparatus. Numerous data also testify to the fact that foreign capital has stepped up its expansionist activity outside of the industrial sector as well. It has actively penetrated, for example, into the "tourist industry," into the sphere of domestic trade, as well as insurance and banking.

The avalanche-like flow of foreign capital investments into the manufacturing industry of the Latin American countries has permitted the American and Western European companies to recoup with interest the well-known losses which they underwent in the late 1960's and early 1970's as a result of the

nationalization of their properties in their traditional spheres of activities--the mining and petroleum-extraction industries.

The mid-1970's distinctly revealed all the multi-level, negative consequences connected with the active and broad-based participation of the TNCs in the economic development of the Latin American countries. First of all, there was a diversification of the forms of the economic dependence of these countries on the principal centers of capitalism and the TNCs, and, as a result of this, their exploitation was intensified. During the first half of the 1970's (1970--1976) alone the Latin American countries paid out to the imperialist states in the form of profits and interest on loans some 31.6 billion dollars, including 7.6 billion from Brazil, 9.3 from Mexico, and 2.4 billion from Argentina. If in 1970 the annual total of such payments for the region as a whole amounted to 2.8 billion dollars, in 1976 rose to 6.6 billion, or an increase by a factor of 2.3. To this should be added the multi-billion-dollar payments to amortize the foreign debt, which by the end of 1975 had surpassed 62 billion dollars. Taking into account these amortization payments, the total sum of money paid out to the developed capitalist states in 1975 amounted to more than 33 percent of the value of all the Latin American exports. Moreover, in a number of countries (Brazil, Mexico, and others) it reached 50 percent and more.¹³

Furthermore, there was a worsening in the balance of payments situation for the countries of this region. Its deficit increased from 3.1 billion dollars in 1970 to 11.2 billion in 1976, and in toto for the years indicated it came to an enormous figure: 41.7 billion dollars. This has not only limited the import possibilities of the Latin American countries and thereby applied the brakes to their economic, and, in particular, their industrial growth, but has also forced them year after year to enter upon ever-newer debts, to plug up the breaches in the balance of payments by means of new, large-scale injections of foreign capital. In 1976 alone the latter reached 13.1 billion dollars, as contrasted with 4.6 billion in 1970.¹⁴

Along with this, there was an intensification under the aegis of the TNC's of the process of concentration of production and centralization of capital, monopolization of all economic activity; this was accompanied by a crowding out of national capital from many sectors of production or its reduction to the position of a dependent, junior partner of the foreign monopolies.

Finally, in connection with the intensified concentration of capital and monopolization of the domestic market under the aegis of the TNCs, other "derivative" phenomena have been observed; these have caused considerable harm to the national economy and the local bourgeoisie. They consist of a constantly increasing utilization by foreign companies of local financial resources (credits of private and state banks), the intensification of their influence on forming the structure of the population's effective demand (especially that of the middle-class, urban strata), and an unfavorable influence on the labor market.

By the mid-1970's the dependent capitalist development had led to a situation whereby the chief moving forces in the socioeconomic development of many of the region's countries had become the state sector and the TNCs in the person of their local branches and divisions, covered by national tasks. The big, national, private capital which has taken part in the bloc of forces for capitalist development has turned out to be pushed into the background. Relations between the principal participants in this bloc--state and foreign capital have also taken on a unique shape. As has been indicated, the positions of the state sector in the economy of a number of the countries in this region are extremely significant. They have been extended, in particular, as a result of the nationalization of a number of sectors during the late 1960's and the first half of the 1970's in such countries as Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, Guyana, and others. However, the spheres of primary activity of the state sector's enterprises are specific and, on the whole, limited. And the field of the TNCs' activity in the region's economy is considerably more diverse. Although in the absolute magnitude of their assets the latter sometimes yield to the state enterprises, they function in the most dynamic spheres of production, and the level of their profits often exceeds the incomes of the state companies.

Does everything stated above signify that, by remaining within the framework of the world capitalist economic system, the Latin American countries are fatally doomed to backwardness and dependence? Does it mean that national capitalism, "crushed" by the TNCs and still suffering from obvious weaknesses, conditioned by its historically delayed and deformed development, will be shorn of any sort of potentials in its struggle against foreign monopolistic capitalism? There can scarcely be any simple answers to these questions, which are addressed to the future. The evolution of the Latin American countries along the capitalist path in general testifies to the fact that no matter how strong the foreign dependence may be, it does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the development of national capitalism. The possibilities of realising its potentials increase insofar as the native, in particular, the industrial, bourgeoisie acquires experience in organizing large-scale, up-to-date production (including that assisted by the TNCs), and strives to rely more extensively on the support of the national state, arousing the ruling circles to adopt investment-limiting measures with regard to the foreign monopolies. The native bourgeoisie is attempting to adapt the state sector to their own interests, to extract for themselves the profits from the nationalization of certain key sectors of the economy (especially the petroleum and mining industries--abundant sources of accumulations and currency funds).

The development of national capitalism is also favored by a number of external circumstances. In the present international situation imperialism is sometimes compelled to make substantial concessions to the native bourgeoisie--its most prospective class ally within the developing countries. Specific additional possibilities for its development proceed from the inter-imperialist conflicts which are especially acute at the present-day stage. The competing sides are sometimes prepared to accept certain conditions of

the developing countries for the sake of preserving their own positions in the competitive struggle.

The conclusion presents itself that individual dependent countries, including the Latin American ones, may in the future rise to a considerable higher level of economic development within the framework of the world capitalist system of economy and occupy a relatively independent position within it. In Latin America the most probable candidate for the category of such countries is Mexico.

But something else is also obvious: we may be speaking only about individual instances, exceptions from the general rule. As regards the principal mass of this region's developing countries, their possibilities for rising to the level of the economic and social development of the industrial capitalist states appears extremely problematical. The system of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism constantly keeps them at a "respectful distance" from the industrial states. And within this trend the scientific and technical revolution is operating in the world of capital, increasing the qualitative differences within the structure of productive forces and forms of production organization in the centers and on the periphery of the world capitalist economic system.

The path of delayed capitalist development within the framework of a renovated system of the world capitalist economy does not promise the popular masses any salvation from oppression and exploitation. It is fraught with the same contradictions and vices which are inherent to world capitalism as a whole with the only difference being that in the dependent countries they appear in sharper relief and have a more painful effect on the position of the society's laboring strata. Despite all the efforts of imperialism and its native class allies to blunt the sharpness of the external and internal contradictions of the Latin American countries' capitalist development, the class struggle in this region has intensified, and the revolutionary liberation process has become more profound. An important factor in the struggle of the Latin American peoples for the consolidation of their independence and for social progress is the moral and political support of their just aspirations by the Soviet Union and by other states of the socialist community. The expanding economic and political cooperation among the Latin American countries also serves the goals of such support.

FOOTNOTES

6. The flow of immigrants into Latin America numbered many millions. Thus, from 1857 through 1924 some 5.5 million settlers came to Argentina, while 3.9 million entered Brazil (from 1821 through 1924). In Argentina during the period 1881--1890 there were 2,257 settlers arriving for every 10,000 inhabitants, and in 1913 this figure reached 3,831. See I. M. Braslavskiy, "Mirovoye kapitalisticheskoye khozyaystvo i mezhdu-narodnyye ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya" [The World Capitalist Economy and International Economic Relations], Kiev, 1968, pp 177--178.

10. K. N. Brutents, "Osvobodivshiesya strany v 70-e gody" (Liberated Countries in the 1970's), Moscow, 1979, pp 86--87.
11. V. V. Vol'skiy, "Latin America within the System of Contemporary Capitalism (Certain Points of Discussion)," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1979, No 3, p 25.
12. N. U. CEPAL, "El desarrollo económico y social y las relaciones externas de América Latina," Guatemala City, 1977, pp 136, 140, 144.
14. Ibid.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON CEMA-LATIN AMERICA TIES REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 80, pp 108-109

(Review by G. K. Seleznev of the book "The CEMA Countries and Latin America: Inter-Governmental Political and Cultural Ties" edited by A. I. Sizonenko, Moscow, "Nauka", 1979, 220 pages)

(Text) This book is the first work in Soviet scholarly literature which is devoted entirely to the problems of development of the political, cultural, and scientific ties between the countries of the socialist community and the states of Latin America. Furthermore, in a certain sense, it also serves as a large contribution to the cycle of studies which were carried out during the 1970's by scholars at the Latin American Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the area of the foreign policy and relations of the Latin American countries with the socialist states.*

The fundamental basis of this monograph, which consists of nine chapters, is the concept that the characteristic trait of the contemporary phase of such relations is their significant activation, broadening, and deepening. Objective reasons for this process during the 1970's include the lessening of international tensions, the continuous growth of the international authority and economic might of the socialist countries, the striving of many Latin American states to carry out an independent foreign policy and to lessen their dependence on imperialist dictates.

This monograph was written on the basis of a wide circle of sources, many of which are being put into scholarly circulation for the first time: the Latin American press as well as newspapers and journals of the socialist states.

A characteristic trait (and certainly a merit) of this book is that it was prepared as a result of cooperation among scholars from almost all the CEMA member countries: included in the authors' group are staff members from the

* See, for example: "CEMA Countries and Latin America: Problems of Economic Cooperation," Moscow, 1976; A. I. Sizonenko, "The Soviet Union and Mexico --50 Years," Moscow, 1974.

PRB, HPR, CDR, MPR, PPR, USSR, CSSR. All the chapters successfully combine an historical analysis of the emergence and development of inter-governmental ties among the groups of countries being considered and a study of their status in the present-day phase.

In analyzing the problems of Soviet-Latin American relations, the authors indicate that in the political ties between the USSR and Latin America there have developed such new forms as cooperation in the UN, meetings and talks at the highest level by prominent state figures (p 9). The materials cited in this book convincingly affirm the conclusion that such meetings represent the briefest and most effective way to deepen mutual understanding and cooperation. Also playing an important role on this level are inter-parliamentary ties; their establishment dates back to the 1950's. In recent times particularly active contacts have been established between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the higher legislative organs of Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia (p 40).

An essential factor in facilitating the growth of trust among peoples and countries is comprised by the cultural and scientific exchanges which have been expanded during the 1970's. Their principal characteristic has been the conclusion of inter-governmental agreements which have made it possible not only to provide a juridical base under such cooperation but also to considerably broaden its range and sphere of activity. The Soviet Union has concluded agreements on cultural and scientific exchanges with Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries. An interesting form of cultural ties during the 1970's has been the holding of days of Soviet culture, as well as weeks of Soviet and Latin American films. The strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and Latin America have also been facilitated by social organizations--institutes and friendship societies which now exist in many countries--in Mexico, Peru, and others.

We must agree with the authors of this book when they note that the 1970's marked especially clear and positive shifts in Soviet-Latin American relations, but that until now all the existing potential opportunities have still not been realized (p 55). Political mutual relations between the USSR and the Latin American states could be developed considerably more broadly and deeply than at present, if this were not being counteracted by reactionary forces in the United States as well as in the countries to the south of the Rio Grande. The policy of these forces is in opposition to the vital interests of the peoples and states of this region; the latter are striving to strengthen their own independence, cooperation, and peace, and they can always count on the support of the USSR in this matter.

Based on abundant factual material, this work demonstrates that the development of political ties between the CEMA members (including Cuba) and the Latin American countries is built on the principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence among states with differing social structures (pp 58--59).

This book is the first study in our country as well as abroad which provides a detailed and circumstantial explanation of the ties between the MPR and Latin America. Other chapters, constructed on the country principle, study the relations between Hungary, the GDR, PPR, and other CEMA member countries and the Latin American states.

Unfortunately, the work under review is not free of defects. The authors are sometimes too miserly in using the possibilities of the problem approach to elucidating a topic, limiting themselves to a simple enumeration of the facts. As a result, the individual sections have a noticeable tendency to provide excessive information and description to the detriment of analysis. It would be logical to formulate basic conclusions about the general traits and characteristics of inter-governmental relations between the CEMA member countries and those of Latin America in the conclusion. For some reason or other, however, this is lacking. The level of working out problems varies from chapter to chapter. Thus, the chapter treating Hungary is written on a qualitatively lower level than the other chapters. Another uneven factor is that certain sections consider the relations of CEMA members only with the capitalist countries of Latin America, while other sections further elucidate relations with socialist Cuba as well.

Nevertheless, on the whole, this book is a useful, valuable work. Such studies help us to better know the interests and aspirations of the Latin American peoples and thereby facilitate the further development of political and cultural ties between the CEMA member countries with the states of Latin America.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON CUBAN HISTORY REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 80, pp 109-112

(Review by Z. I. Sokolova of the book "An Outline History of Cuba" edited by N. M. Lavrov et al., Moscow, "Nauka", 1978, 604 pages)

Text/ The revolutionary process which led to the overthrow of Batista's tyranny and which set Cuba on the socialist track cannot be correctly understood in isolation from the many centuries of struggle by the country's toiling masses for national and social liberation. It was precisely the understanding of the importance of refracting the fundamental problems of the republic's emergence through the prism of the Cuban Revolution which was put forth in the idea of the preparation of the Institute of Universal History of the USSR Academy of Sciences of a voluminous work which could reflect the historical path of the first people in the Western Hemisphere who entered upon the path of socialism. The group of authors which took upon itself the task of solving this large and complex problem undertook the first attempt in the Soviet Union to create an objective, truthful picture of the Cuban historical process, to reveal the dialectics of the country's socioeconomic life over an extent of almost 500 years--right down to our own times.

This group was able to successfully overcome the difficulties which objectively arose in connection with the need to include in one volume all the richness and multi-faceted quality of Cuba's political and socioeconomic evolution. Such a creative success has expressed itself, first of all, in the fact that the scholars concentrated their attention, as N. M. Lavrov, the outline history's chief editor, has justly noted, "on the crucial stages of history, primarily on internal-political and socioeconomic development, the class struggle, and the national-literation movement in close ties with the events of the worldwide historical process" (p 9).

The high, theoretical level of examining complex, sometimes contradictory problems, a wide circle of diverse sources, many of which are being introduced into scholarly circulation for the first time, the compressed and, at the same time, emotionally saturated language, allowed the authors' group to prepare a genuinely profound and important study, of interest to the scholarly community and accessible to the broad masses of readers.

The first two chapters, which provide a brief survey of events prior to and after the establishment of the Spanish domination in Cuba as well as the initial phases of the Cuban people's struggle, are essentially, in accordance with the authors' intentions, introductory in nature. They are necessary for the wholeness of the exposition and for revealing the sources of the principles and specifics of those on which the outline concentrates its principal attention.

Great interest is evoked by Chapters 3 and 4, which are devoted to the national-liberation revolutions of the second half of the 19th century. Analysis of the problems, linked with the revelation of their characteristics during this period, is based on a consideration of such fundamental questions as the formation of the Cuban nation, the development of capitalist relations, and the gradual ripening of antagonistic contradictions between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. The author of these chapters (who also wrote the two preceding and the two ensuing ones), the late A. M. Zorina, devotes particular attention to the gradual nature of the struggle for national liberation. Adhering to the fundamental estimates made of this period by the Program Platform of the Communist Party of Cuba, she emphasizes the following: "The National-Liberation War of 1895--1898, while it was a continuation of the revolutionary process which had begun in the country with the Ten Years' Liberation War, differed from the latter to a large extent.... Like the Ten Years' War, the War of 1895--1898 was a form of anti-colonialist revolution which solved, in addition to the problem of creating a national Cuban state, problems of a bourgeois-democratic nature" (p 143). Also well-reasoned is the conclusion that the foundation of the "social base of the War of 1895--1898 consisted of the urban and rural proletariat, the peasantry, the progressive intelligentsia, and the revolutionary-minded petite bourgeoisie, who were interested in liberation from the oppression of the Spanish colonial yoke" (p 144).

An example of the methodological consistency and restraint shown by this group of authors is the analysis of the aggregate of problems connected with one of the most complex and contradictory periods in the history of Cuba--the period of the so-called "pseudo-republic" (1902--1958). Our attention is compellingly drawn to the fact that, in disclosing the general principles of the revolutionary struggle on this island, the researchers proceed from the necessity of examining problems of fundamental importance. Among them we must include, first of all, the problem of the gradual transformation of the Cuban working class into the leading force of the liberation movement, into the mainspring of social progress. It is not by chance that this problem also becomes the connecting-rod in the analysis of the influence of the ideas of the Great October Revolution on the development of the revolutionary process in Cuba, an influence which found its fullest embodiment in the creation on the island in 1925 of the Communist Party, in the examination of the Revolution of 1933--1935, and especially in the disclosure of the specifics of the revolutionary movement of the 1950's.

A great deal of attention is paid in this monograph to the events of 1933--1935, which are rightly considered as a general rehearsal for the

victorious Cuban Revolution of 1959. E.L. Nitoburg (Chapters 7 and 8) has made an attempt, after synthesizing what is new and what has been researched on this outstanding period in the history of the Cuban liberation movement by Soviet and Cuban scholars, to make on this basis a number of important observations regarding the place and the role of this revolution in the struggle to solve democratic and socialist problems. Also extremely interesting is the analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the revolution of the 1930's, the posing of questions relating to the cowardice of the middle classes and the vacillations of the petite bourgeoisie (p 267), the insufficient organization of the proletariat so that it could fully carry out its leading role in the plan for strengthening the alliance with the peasantry and neutralizing the national bourgeoisie. The following conclusion is also well-grounded: "The revolutionary struggles of 1933-1935 did not pass without a trace: the liberation movement of the Cuban people had been raised to a new and higher level" (loc. cit.).

Of fundamental importance for an understanding of the inner springs of the events connected with the assault on the Moncada barracks, their specifics within the framework of the general principles of the development of the revolutionary struggle is Ye. A. Larin's conclusion (Chapter 9) that the chronic crisis "in which the Cuban economy had been for dozens of years was the result of a socioeconomic structure which had outlived itself and had become the main brake on the development of the country's productive forces" (p 274). The necessity for the "revolutionary break-up of the old economic base" is considered by this author to be a task whose time had come, and for the solution of which the specific conditions had taken shape. For a Marxist interpretation of the general course of Cuban history the following conclusion is also important: "that in the late 1940's and early 1950's a general national crisis began to mature in Cuba, the basic criteria of which were the bankruptcy of the political superstructure, the crisis of the economic structure, and the intensification of the class struggle, which encompassed broad strata of the Cuban society" (p 298).

It seems to us well-grounded and correct that the greatest attention in this outline has been accorded to an examination of the conditions of the development and victorious culmination of the Cuban Revolution, the aggregate of factors assuring its gradual movement forward after the overthrow of Batista's tyranny. In the chapters about this period (10-14), written by O.T. Darusenkov, primary attention is paid to an extensive group of diverse, often unique, sources, the most important among which are materials from the personal records of Fidel Castro. The entire complex of problems raised by this author consists of questions of fundamental importance which require profound dialectical analysis and which do not have any simple solution. O.T. Darusenkov has thoroughly analyzed with great exactness the problem of the formation of the new revolutionary vanguard which provided political leadership for the Cuban Revolution at all the stages of its development, beginning with the assault on the Moncada barracks. This author has made an important contribution to the analysis of the questions of the working out by various political organizations of a unified platform for the

revolutionary movement on the threshold of the overthrow of Batista's tyranny and the achievement of organizational unity on a Marxist-Leninist platform after this tyranny was smashed, in the course of the democratic revolution's transformation into a socialist one, as well as a study of the problems of the emergence of the new Communist Party of Cuba as the ruling party. O. T. Darusenkov is, perhaps, the only Soviet author who has very definitively posed the question that this fact, in and by itself, reflects the activity of the general principle of building socialism (pp 451-461).

This author's contribution to working out the problem of the formation of the unity of the revolutionary forces is all the more significant in that he dialectically, without avoiding the sharp angles, discloses the most complex and contradictory factors. Chapter 12 of the "Outline" is, without a doubt, one of the most successful. It cites convincing facts and weighty proofs in affirming the conclusion that the process of forming a unity of revolutionaries was according to principle and that unity itself became possible only under conditions of the development of a revolution which required this.

Also interesting is Chapter 15, written by I. R. Grigulevich, which examines the questions of the historiography of Cuba during the period from the 16th through the 20th centuries. The analysis of the paths of development taken by Cuban national historiography must be considered an undoubted success; also important is the fact that the author devotes attention to the problem of the emergence of the Marxist trend.

The slight individual errors which occur in no way detract from the significance of this enormous work and the contributions made by the authors' group to the elucidation of the entire aggregate of the problems touched upon. This book completely deserves the high marks which Raúl Castro gave it in his Introduction as follows: "With satisfaction and gratitude we greet this conscientious and fruitful work, which was done by a group of Soviet historians in order to bring to the reader the uniqueness of the Cuban revolutionary process and to show its characteristics not on the level of exclusivity but as a concrete and specific manifestation of the universal" (p 4).

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NATIONAL

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ATTACKED FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES

Tselinograd FREUNDSCHAFT in German 7 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Viktor Krestyaninov, candidate in the philosophical sciences: "Under the Cover of Religion"]

[Text] In the struggle against socialist countries, imperialist propaganda is attaching more and more significance to religion. Among the organizations that are engaged in active propaganda for anticomunist ideology, the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses with its central office in Brooklyn (a suburb of New York) is occupying a place of special significance.

In the USSR, the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses exists in the form of two organizationally separate groups. The first one was established in Russia during the forties of the 19th century. Today this sect does not have a large number of followers. They call themselves "Jehovists." The second group was established during the seventies of the 19th century in the United States, in the state of Pennsylvania. To this day it remains faithfully on the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

The organization of the Jehovah's Witnesses has groups in almost all of the countries of the world, it publishes dozens of magazines, hundreds of newspapers, millions of issues of various writings in 98 languages, it owns a transmitter which broadcasts programs in 50 languages of the world.

The Jehovah's Witnesses are attempting to conduct illegal subversive activity at the instruction of the central office in Brooklyn. The pamphlet by Knorr, "The Theocratic Organization and Its Administrative Organ," for instance, contains a direct reference to the assistance by the U.S. State Department "for the protection of assets and the activity of Jehovah's Witnesses organizations in various countries." Brooklyn also receives active support from the governments of the NATO countries for its propagation of the Jehovah's Witnesses in socialist and other democratic countries.

The Jehovah's Witnesses have a rigidly centralized organization built on iron discipline. The organization is directed by a president and seven directors. The highest power in Brooklyn has divided the globe into 10 zones. Offices have been organized in every zone; they are headed by Brooklyn's servants who are directly subordinated to the president. The European zone, for instance, is administered from the office in Bern, Switzerland. A zone usually has between 8 and 10 branches; at the present time there are approximately 80 such branch offices.

Some of them are in charge of several bordering states. The branches have their own publishing houses, mission schools and an extensive propaganda apparatus. In Europe such branches of the world central office can be found in the FRG, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, Greece.

The most important document establishing the direction of the organization is called "Organizational Instructions for the Proclaimers of the Kingdom." It was approved at the 1948 Congress of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The basic organizational unit of the sect is the group. The number of members and its organization have not remained stable. The fact is that in recent years, on instructions from Brooklyn, Jehovah's Witnesses groups in the USSR have changed their internal structure several times.

In 1957, for instance, the Regional Committee of the Jehovah's Witnesses in the USSR issued special instructions for the group leaders—"The Pastoral Task for Circle Servants." It contained instructions for the group preachers to intensify their conspiratorial mission activities; for this purpose groups were to be divided into smaller independently acting circles.

The doctrine of the Jehovah's Witnesses is of a reactionary character. What is the nature of it? All the people on this earth are to pray to the one and only God Jehovah. The God Jehovah has two sons—Jesus Christ and Satan. Although Satan is God's son, he did not want to submit himself to the will of the Father and he is constantly committing evil deeds on this earth, together with his supporters among men—the Satanists. Consequently, between the God Jehovah and the Jehovah's Witnesses on one hand and Satan and the Satanists on the other hand, there has been a struggle for the power over the world from time immemorial. The entire doctrine of the Jehovah's Witnesses is therefore penetrated by the spirit of the constant battle of these two forces, hate and hostility, toward all those things that are outside the organization of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Charity is only possible toward fellow believers. Whereas ordinary Christian confessions always appear under the cover of humanism, love for mankind, Jehovah's Witnesses disdain such cover.

The ideology of the Jehovah's Witnesses demands that the yoke of modern civilization be cast off. Their first commandment is: hate one another, kill one another. "International friendship," they write, "means hostility toward the Lord." "Mankind is approaching its day of annihilation," they declare.

In the opinion of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the focal point of their doctrine is the idea of the "big Armageddon," i.e. the biggest war that is to take place during the lifetime of the current generation. Jehovah's Witnesses theologians maintain that the battle of Armageddon has already begun. As it happened, in 1914 during the battle in the sky Christ succeeded in hurling down Satan. Satan is gathering on earth his supporters—the Satanists, and Christ, who likewise appeared on earth (invisible), is gathering the Jehovah's Witnesses. In their opinion, World War I and World War II constituted the preliminary phase of the battle of Armageddon.

In their sermons Jehovah's Witnesses put the heaviest emphasis on various "signs" that supposedly bear witness to the fact that Armageddon has begun. In addition to wars, such signs are earthquakes, the increase in crime and immorality, the establishment of the "Satanic" United Nations and, in particular, the establishment of communist states.

Modern theologians of the Jehovah's Witnesses are directly and openly connecting the battle of Armageddon with World War III.

They have reduced the term "Satanic world" to "godless communism." Their doctrine bears a distinctly anticommunist, anti-Soviet and misanthropic character. It is also clear that the rocket-nuclear psychosis which is presently being fomented by the most reactionary circles of imperialist states led by the United States and the propaganda of the battle of Armageddon are complementing each other. It is precisely the class character of the main dogma of the Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine--the myth of Armageddon.

Among the conditions for the existence and the antagonism of two opposing systems--capitalism and socialism--Jehovah's Witnesses ideologists are propagating Armageddon as a new "Holy World War" during which all Satanists including their states (the communist countries) will be annihilated and following which the 1,000-year kingdom of Jesus Christ on earth will be established. It will be a new type of a unified state, the so-called "theocratic republic."

The Jehovah's Witnesses doctrine of the theocratic state is closely related to the idea of a world state which for a long time has been entertained by American imperialism.

The reactionary, distinctly sociopolitical character of the Jehovah's Witnesses dogmatism is based on its practical activity. The sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses is one of the most hostile religious organizations because of its attitude toward our socialist society.

Not long ago, Brooklyn was still asking the believers in socialist countries to boycott state laws, to refuse military service, participation in the election of powerful organizations etc. Now the solution to these questions is left to the "personal conscience" of the believer, but, according to the preachers, the "personal conscience" must not contradict the major demands of the teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses.

Thus, under the cover of religion anticommunism is preached. The structure of the sect already indicates that the leaders in the Brooklyn central office did not establish the organization for the religious needs of believers but above all for the solution of political problems. In the process, religion serves only as a cover. In this connection, it must be emphasized that only because of this cover the organization succeeds in catching in its nets the souls of gullible simpletons.

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SWEDISH PRESS: ESTONIA RIOTS STEM FROM ECONOMIC DECLINE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Kjell Dragnes: "Estonia: Protests and Dissatisfaction Despite Economic Prosperity"]

[Text] About 20 Estonian youths are being held following demonstrations in the capital city of Tallinn, and are threatened with up to 5 years imprisonment, according to Estonians who live in Sweden but have good contacts with their homeland. Furthermore about 100 youths have been expelled from schools in Tallinn after repeated disturbances during September and October.

Moscow-- The widespread youth demonstrations in Estonia, which were immediately called "disruptive of order and inspired by agitators and rabble" by Soviet authorities, can perhaps to a certain degree be called just that. But at the same time they are symptoms of unsolved problems and underlying currents which exist even in Estonia, which on the surface appears calm and prosperous.

It has been 40 years since Soviet power was reestablished in the republic, as official Soviet history tells it, or since Estonia was occupied by Russia, as Estonians, both in exile and in Estonia, tell it. Those 40 years have changed Estonian society and have made the republic the most prosperous in the Soviet Union.

Estonians can boast of a living standard above that of almost all the other republics, with the possible exception of their two Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania, which this year are also celebrating or mourning the 40th anniversary of their absorption into the Soviet Union. That good economic condition has been a contributory reason why the Estonians have accepted their fate as a Soviet republic and made the best of the situation.

The Estonians have also enjoyed a freedom that the Russians have not shared. Commonality of language and the short distance to Finland have made it possible for the Estonians to keep up with what is happening in the world and have given them an alternative source of information in a country where otherwise all information is controlled from Moscow.

The Finns believe that they can easily understand 60 percent of Estonian, and among the Estonians who have their TV sets adjusted toward Helsinki the understanding of Finnish is probably higher. In many ways Tallinn is unlike a Soviet city--it has been called "the Soviet's freest city."

Many Estonians live in their own houses, in sharp contrast to the large Russian cities (and also the countryside) where monotonous multi-family dwellings predominate. The skillful farmers produce harvests which are on a level with Sweden's, and they earn more than industrial workers, which is also in contrast to the circumstances in Russia.

But in spite of that, spontaneous demonstrations occur demanding that Estonia be free as it was for 22 years between the wars, and that the Russians go back to Russia. Reports of the disturbances indicate that they originally did not have political objectives, but the dissatisfaction and opposition became so great that they rather quickly assumed political character.

The background of this situation is partly economic--the back side of Estonia's economic wonder. A small population, a hard labor market, and very little population growth have paved the way for a flood of Russians and other nationalities. Last year the population count showed that of the country's 1,465,000 inhabitants, 948,000 (64.7 percent) were Estonians. The number of Russians was 409,000 (27.9 percent). Proportionally the Estonians are becoming fewer, as in 1949 they comprised 88 percent of the population.

It is not unknown for Russians to sometimes behave coldly, if not with outright hostility, even if there have not previously been such widespread demonstrations demanding that the Russians leave Estonia.

The economic difficulties in which the Soviet Union finds itself can also have contributed to a smoldering dissatisfaction bursting into flame. The Estonian opposition has pointed out that the living standard in Estonia has fallen and that shortages of merchandise exist. This is supported by the nonpolitical demands of youth for heat in the school buildings and better school meals.

In many ways Estonia's problems are also characteristic of the other two Baltic states. The problem of keeping its individuality under pressure from a great neighbor, the problem of keeping its language under hard pressure from the centrally directed Russian media, and the problem of low population growth.

The Estonian protest is also a symptom of the national currents in the multinational Soviet state. The Russians comprise only half of the total population of the Soviet Union, but they have a firm grip on the top of the party and the country. It is a control which Moscow does not want to lose.

Disturbances in Vilnius, Lithuania, several years ago were very similar to those in Tallinn, and they were suppressed with an iron hand. As the short official report on the problems in Tallinn laconically stated, "When all the facts are known, the responsible individuals will be brought to trial."

REGIONAL

DEFICIENCIES IN UZBEK SOVKHOZ PRODUCTION PROTESTED

Some Are Falling Behind

Tashkent SOVET OZBEKISTANI in Uzbek 7 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] The decisive moment in the Uzbekistan cotton harvest is at hand. The rayon of RamitMn, Ghijduvan, Peshku, Boka, GhM1MbM and Piskent, which have mobilized every effort and technical means for this purpose, are fulfilling year plans for the people's economy that were established for cotton processing and are doing well by their delivery of the "white gold" as the lofty Socialist obligation. Cotton raisers of ShMhpisNbz, QMmMshi, TallimMrjan, Shorchi and other leading rayon are also achieving great successes. Worthy of note is the fact that the harvest tempo has by no means fallen off in these rayon, on the contrary, it is being accelerated through all possible means. Fulfillment of their socialist duties, before anything, has become an honorable obligation of the cotton raisers of leading rayon.

The selfless laborers and strong equipment operations of the harvesters of Kamsamalabad, AktyMbr', Il'ich, KMttMqorghan, Khirav and other rayon are honorably approaching closer and closer to their goal. Cotton raisers of these rayon, which have taken advantage of every minute of time during the harvest, have retained their superiority, whether during daily cultivation of the cotton or in total cotton processing.

The secret of the success of the leading rayon is that leaders of party and soviet organizations, and of agricultural agencies, are, exploiting their positions of influence, taking measures to raise the productivity of harvesters and equipment operators and to ensure the avantguardism of communist, increasing the influence of mass-political, organizational-educational and ideological work, strengthening socialist competition, absolutely putting an end to carelessness, indifference and footdragging while fortifying labor discipline, and making the experience of leading harvesters the property of all.

However, in the rayon of Kagan, PMyMriq, Akhuibabaev, Baghat, TMykhtMkopir, Chimbay, JMylalquduq, QorghantepM, ZMdMrya and Uchqorghan, which have let slip the favorable moment, they have fallen prey to laggardness in late harvesting of cotton and delivery to the state. The rayon of Usman, Yusupav, Mirzachol and Sherabad, which have been successful in past years in being among the ranks of leading rayon that have carried out their work with good organization, have fallen into the very last places this year within the Uzbekistan republic. It is unfortunate that the

leaders of these rayon have made many promises concerning a drastic change in harvesting but have not kept their promises in practice. Because schedules have not been maintained, large quantities of "white gold" have not been delivered to processing points and cotton cleaning factories.

It is right that the people of Uzbekistan ask the leaders of those rayon what they are waiting for in the cotton harvest. In a meeting relayed by closed circuit through the republic, harsh criticism was uttered to the detriment of ZNdMrya rayon. Unfortunately, the criticism was fair but no conclusions were drawn from it and drastic change has not been made in cotton harvesting. But perhaps the leaders of those rayon are expecting the balmy air of summer to come again? That the bolls have not opened or the leaves fallen are raised as pretexts. To tell the truth, if they haven't opened by now when will the bolls open? Rumor has it that in those rayon, which are preventing the attainment of high index figures in cotton processing for the republic, sufficient attention has not been given to the decisive importance of machinery. A formalistic approach has been made to organizing competition among the mechanics and drivers and suitable cultural and service conditions have not been created to ensure that field workers work with high productivity. Another deficiency is that all persons capable of labor have not been completely mobilized for the work. Under conditions whereby seasonal workers have been brought in from the city, a portion of kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers are busy with marketing and work on private plots. Party organizations have not increased responsibility and coercion with respect to the outcome of the harvest.

There is a large crop in the fields. Achieving its rapid harvesting and fulfillment of plans and obligations in a short time is the duty of party and soviet organizations. For this reason it is necessary to put each and every "blue ship" to work, keep them on the job, and increase efficiency in every possible way. However, for various reasons, equipment is idle in some oblasts. For example, more than 1500 pieces of equipment are not participating each day in the harvest in the QarMqipaghistan ASSR, and 600-700 in Andijan and Farghand oblasts. In NMmMngan oblast the number of idle pieces of equipment exceeds 500. Since daily cotton processing schedules exist great hopes are being placed, by necessity, upon the equipment. This being the case, when will the idle pieces of equipment be sent to their assignments? Leaders of Kolkhoz and sovkhoz and of oblast and rayon agricultural motor pool units must give serious thought to the matter and bring about the unconditional, full capacity operation of harvesting technology during these days.

The Woes of NMjmiddin Aliiev

Tashkent SOVET OZBEKİSTANI in Uzbek 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Looking at the day's production figures NMjmiddin Aliiev became angry again. "Don't I have troubles! All of a sudden all the neighboring sovkhoz began cotton harvesting all at once, as if they had made a pact. And what do you know, in a month or so they have left the Savetabad sovkhoz behind only half finished with the harvest." Aliiev could not endure the fact that the PagpMnichnik and Kamsamalabad Sovkhoz, which has always lagged behind everyone else, had made a leap forward to occupy first place, shameing the Savetabad people, and that now, both in the rayon and in the oblast, people were making jokes all day at their expense. Whenever a few people gather, whatever the occasion, they all point the finger at Aliiev. In

In particular, not long ago, when the fortnightly report was made on the cotton harvest at the rayon, an anonymous anecdote emerged from the director's slaughter house. And what did it say? The circulating red banner given to leading units was set up in the rayon. It was proposed that some symbol be established also to distinguish the laggardness of the laggards. Well!

"My goodness, they even said that! If they want to be leaders in their cotton, well and good, but why do they have to get on the nerves of others." Aliev endured everything, but could not bear to talk about this anecdote, which seemed to point at him, but could not ignore it. The anecdote is being repeated and after it spread another anecdote nailed him down again. "If one of the symbols is given to Savetabad sovkhoz it will match very well the value of today's effort..."

"Aliev melted into his seat. He was so ashamed that he didn't know what to do with himself. He lowered his head and sat in silence. And why is all the blame his? He thought about why things had gone badly. He had spoken at various meetings before the season started, eight or so in all, he thought.

When he said: "We will process 5-6 percent of the cotton each day with 110 harvesting machines. We will harvest a minimum of 10 tons each day per machine." there was such applause.

If all of the things he said had been done NHjmiddin Aliev would now be puffing his chest far out and saying: Look at me! Look what I have done about the cotton harvest!" Unfortunately, something else happened, events turned out differently in practice. All the promises given at the meetings turned out to be soap bubbles and burst in the wind. Repairs were not completed on 19 harvesting machines, the whole operation was lamed and it became impossible for the remaining units to harvest much more than 4-4½ tons of cotton. Was this not one reason why even half of norms set in schedules were unfulfilled.

NHjmiddin Aliev ignored the facts connected with hand harvesting and the burden grew. Only 1417 persons, out of 1632, participated in the harvest. Well now, where were the remaining 215 harvesters? Whereas each of 520 persons sent to aid in the harvest from neighboring areas harvested 48 kilograms of cotton each day, on the average, why was it that the amount harvested by sovkhoz workers was approximately 40 kilograms per person. Was it because of a decline of discipline in these brigades or because of the neglect of some sovkhoz director. No, in fact NHjmiddin Aliev could not endure the situation at all. He called a meeting forthwith and taught them a lesson.

"Words are like an arrow shot from a bow." For three whole hours, during broad daylight, the director assembled the chiefs of all sovkhoz divisions and brigade heads. He talked bitterly and angrily. He called up everything that had happened and asked questions about it. He finished by assigning tasks to the assembly.

"Every brigade must achieve a minimum daily rate of five percent. In particular, I would like to drill this into the heads of the 4th division headed by Astan Alliev. The brigade headed by Quvandiz Esanqulov, must fulfill the plan within 2-3 days."

The brigade heads looked at one another in amazement and shrugged their shoulders. No one told the director of the anxiety he was feeling inside and they had no other choice but to disperse quietly. We found our way to the brigade headed by Quvandiq Esanqulov, who had to fulfill the plan within 2-3 days. They had a field of 8 hectares. Five harvesting machines were working there. But while half of the opened cotton fell into the tanks of the harvesting machines, half fell onto the ground. The brushes of the machine controlled by equipment operator Pñnji Khalmuradov had broken off and fallen somewhere and he was amazed that somehow the cotton of one hectar had somehow been harvested. The machine of equipment operator Rñim Ziyaev failed to move out of the furrows correctly and did damage by squashing cotton plants in the beds. In one area units with full tanks were parked at the edge of the fields on the ground without having unloaded their cotton. The reason was that although sovkhoz leaders had promised the group that "we will transfer the load into ten trucks," they did not fulfill their promise this time as well. They have had only four trucks to load into. The reason is that equipment operators, who can barely deliver the harvest that is being sent to processing units in 3-4 hours, are required to make only two runs to the processing point a day.

"The promise of our sovkhoz leaders to the equipment operators that they would provide all conditions necessary for smooth operation also turned out to be hot air," said brigade head Q. Esanqulov with regret. "Hot food was not prepared at noon, mechanics and drivers had to make a lunch on bread and melons that they had brought along with them. We had heard that vendor, medical, cultural and service workers were to be gathered together for those in the field, but we haven't seen them so far."

Yes, this was the thing that made everyone so sad. Vendor, medical and service workers had business with organizations of Gñgñrin rayon. However, what was the reason that their business with Savetabad sovkhoz party committee secretary Bekmirzñ Khalmirzñev, sovkhoz vice-director for cultural works Mñsturñ Astññqulava and village soviet chairman Zñfñr Musñev was so messed up? A month passed after the time that they went to those brigades and departed giving the promise that "we will assemble an agitation train, wait for it." But this promise was also empty.

In short, the leaders of Savetabad sovkhoz, which made so many big promises at the beginning of the harvest, puffing themselves up, are now, just at the culmination of the harvest, fumbling about rather than showing decisiveness. This is the reason that discipline has fallen off among the workers, that the harvest tempo is slowing down than speeding up, that much time is being wasted in looking for reasons to slow down instead of putting the "blue ships" to work day and night. Sovkhoz leaders must not forget that carrying out promises is a manly work.

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REGIONAL

ARMENIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY ATTACKED IN BOOK

Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 26 Sep 80 p 2

Review by Candidate of Legal Sciences N. Apiyan, senior research associate of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, of the book "Ideyno-politicheskiy krakh partii dashnaktsyutin" (The Ideological and Political Collapse of the Armenian Independence Party) by B. Ananikyan, Izdatel'stvo "Ayastan": "Doomed by Time"

Text At the present stage the Armenian Independence Party together with the reactionary forces of imperialism are taking an active part in ideological subversive activities against Marxism-Leninism. For this reason the consistent struggle against the ideology and practice of this party, the exposure of its antidemocratic, antipopular essence and the unmasking of its bourgeois nationalistic policy continue to retain their urgency and importance.

"In performing work on international education," it was noted at the October (1976) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, "we should consistently expose the ideological subversive activities of anticomunism and modern revisionism, the antipopular essence of the ideology and practice of the Armenian Independence Party."

The book of B. Ananikyan "Ideyno-politicheskiy krakh partii dashnaktsyutin" The Ideological and Political Collapse of the Armenian Independence Party, which was published by Izdatel'stvo "Ayastan", is devoted precisely to this problem. On the basis of the study of documents and the thorough analysis of concrete historical facts and events the author reveals the ideological bankruptcy and political collapse of the Armenian Independence Party and gives a critical evaluation of the subjective idealistic views of the representatives of this party.

Of great importance for a detailed and clear idea of the class essence of the Armenian independence movement are the study of its social composition and the investigation of the serious contradictions and conflicts within this party. Such an approach to the study of the essence of the Armenian independence movement enabled the historian to draw the correct conclusion: the Armenian Independence Party is the creation of the Armenian bourgeoisie. Fulfilling the will of the bourgeoisie and placing in the forefront "all-Armenian" problems, this party entered into an alliance with the reactionary forces, striving to isolate the Armenian people from the general revolutionary movement.

A special chapter of the book is devoted to the revelation of the reactionary essence of the nationalism of the Armenian independence movement, to the views of its ideologists on the role of the popular masses and the individual in history. In the book it is shown on the basis of concrete example, what terrible consequences the nationalistic policy, particularly its idea of the "Armenianization of Armenia," had for the fate of the Armenian people. The members of the Armenian independence movement by their policy more than once placed the Armenian people on the verge of a national catastrophe.

In comparing pre-Soviet Armenia with Soviet Armenia, B. Ananikyan depicts the unprecedented success of the Armenian people in the fraternal family of Soviet republics. Owing to the friendship and disinterested assistance of the Soviet peoples, and first of all the Great Russian people, Soviet Armenia also achieved recognition and prestige on the international arena. But to this day the Armenian independence movement has ignored this fact.

In the national question, the author indicates, in the ideology of the Armenian independence movement true chaos also prevailed. Without taking the trouble to study Marxism from the original works, the current apologists of the ideas of the Armenian independence movement assert that Marxism underestimated the idea of the self-determination of nations. They crudely and deliberately distort the historical facts and events.

The author exposes and refutes the mendacious nature of these fabrications, opposing to them the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the national question. At the same time the comprehensive program, which was elaborated by the CPSU for the purpose of the practical solution of the national question in the USSR, the development and improvement of international relations in our country, is discussed in the book.

The study of the ideology of the Armenian independence movement leads to an indisputable conclusion: this party did not believe in the creative force and reason of the Armenian people, saw in them a blind crowd which is moved only by instincts, used them only as a means of achieving their own goals, which, as is known, were alien to the broad popular masses.

The scholar debunks the disastrous tactical policy of the members of the Armenian independence movement. The main reason for the elaboration of such a disastrous policy, in the author's opinion, is the fact that the Armenian Independence Party from the first days of its creation ignored the objective conditions and laws of the development of social life. While advocating so-called partisan war, they recognized as its main form terror, which lessened the tension of the class struggle and disorganized the ranks of the revolutionary forces.

Relying on documentary sources, the author reveals the antidemocratic, antipopular essence of the "independent Armenian democratic republic," which existed about three years. Such a digression into history is as if to warn the modern apologists of the Armenian independence movement not to take pride in such an inglorious past. Examples, which attest to the hostile activity of the members of the Armenian independence movement against Soviet power after the fall of their regime, are cited together with this. The self-exposure of the leaders of the Armenian independence movement occurred after the February venture, which became a difficult test for the workers of Armenia.

Of great interest are the sections, in which the activity of the Armenian Independence Party as the lackey of imperialism, its agent is examined. Having lost hope in the attempts by some political levers to influence Soviet Armenia, the Armenian independence movement today has made as the main condition of its existence an open ideological struggle against the Soviet Union, and particularly Soviet Armenia, as well as the socialist camp and the national liberation movement. Being in the ideological service of imperialism, the members of the Armenian independence movement by their ideological subsersive activities, the spearhead of which is aimed against Soviet Armenia, are creating the conditions for the slander by reactionary forces of the great community of the Soviet peoples.

The monograph is rich in factual material. However, in it, unfortunately, there is no analysis of the documents of the independent Armenian government, which were published by the workers' and peasants' government of Armenia in 1922 on the pages of the press. Meanwhile these documents would cast a new light on the adventuristic policy of the Armenian independence movement both within the country and in the international arena, where they have speculated in national interests for their narrow class goals. There is also no indication in the book of the fact that after the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia many rank and file members of the Armenian independence movement declared their break with this party and recognized its existence under the new historical conditions to be harmful for the Armenian people.

The book of B. Ananikyan shows thoroughly and convincingly the adventuristic policy of the Armenian Independence Party, which inevitably led it to complete ideological and political collapse.

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